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Abstract 
 
 The European Union has a significant task in managing the issues which arise from 
having 23 official languages. Preferences for language are diverse as are abilities. Further 
despite EU efforts in promoting multilingualism some criticism still prevails.  The European 
Monetary Union is seen through the barriers present to mobility and the realization of a 
optimum currency area. Data on over 130 countries is presented as well for an index and model 
of language value. Finally I propose a policy which works within the trilingual intentions of the 
EU while geared towards the economic incentives language can provide. 
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Introduction 
For over 50 years the European Union (EU) has established itself as a pioneer in 
experimental economic and political integration by creating a working model to be studied, 
added to, and adjusted when necessary. Unity has been a gradual process since the creation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and later the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) enacted through the Treaty of Rome in 
1957. In a desired exit from the stark nationalism which divided the continent so severely for 
the preceding 60 years, the ideals of this community has been a move towards commonality, 
both politically and economically, and mutually beneficial cooperation. From its inception the 
EU has maintained consistent themes and approaches as to how to move forward, each treaty 
building within ideals birthed from previous treaties.  With the desired outcome of a flexible 
unit that acts singularly, yet with respect to national sovereignty and national identity through 
the acknowledgement of, and respect for, the various cultural differences among its 
inhabitants. 
 During the process of integration, these cultural discrepancies have, at times, been an 
issue around which the EU has had to tiptoe carefully. In the year 2000 the EU adopted the 
slogan, “Unity in Diversity,” as its motto and there is no doubt a great effort put forth by the EU 
to protect the unique cultural characteristics inherent to the individual Member States (Karoly, 
1). It is a complex balance between integration and protection, but with the aims of a mobile 
market and economic cooperation, the two are often pitted against each other in a zero sum 
  
4 
 
game. One area where the European Union and its Member States have struggled to balance 
their aims is in its language policy.  
 The importance of language in the functioning of a modern globalized society should be 
apparent. Economically, politically, and socially, language is of vital importance in achieving the 
goals of not only integration in these three areas, but for facilitating social solidarity and the 
feeling of a Euro citizenship that the EU has itself promoted. This social cooperation is a major 
part of the foundation by which willing cooperation, both economically and politically, can hope 
to be achieved, and for success to be optimized. In order to fulfill the ideal the EU has created 
for itself, understanding how to handle the complex situation of language in creating successful 
policy is necessary. 
 It is not to say that the EU has ignored the power and importance of language. As we 
will see later the EU has dedicated time and resources into evaluating language. It has often 
communicated its desire to preserve the language diversity of the Union while improving the 
ability of citizens of all Member States to communicate with each other in hopes of cohesion 
and mobility. Current policy has proven inadequate, however, in achieving the goals of the EU. 
It has lacked the definition and vision needed to not only mitigate the complex dynamic of 
language in the EU, but to use it to the advantage of the EU and its Member States. The 
question should not become how do we manage our language problem, but how do we 
maximize a great natural resource? 
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 It is my assertion that policy regarding the complex language situation of Europe is of 
utmost importance in solidifying the aims and identity of the European Union. Where the EU 
has previously been a leader in cooperative economic and political policy, it needs to become a 
leader in progressive cultural cooperation. While some may argue that cultural issues cannot be 
tackled without infringing upon the nations themselves I will only argue that with regard to a 
progressive language policy, this does not need to be the case. The EU needs a language policy 
as dynamic as the situation itself. If the EU intends to promote a single image politically and 
economically, it must not be afraid to ask for other concessions when limited and appropriate.  
 Over the course of this thesis design I will go in depth on a number of issues related to 
the importance of language and language policy in the European Union. In the first section, an 
overview of language in the European Union will be presented. From languages spoken and 
attitudes towards language, to actions taken by the EU their critics, a foundation will be laid to 
provide an understanding of the current language dynamic in Europe. In section two, this 
dynamic will be presented in terms of the economic aims of the European Union including a 
look at the EU as an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). In section three, both the language index 
and production formula will be unveiled to pinpoint current language value and speculate on 
the future production of languages across the globe. In the final section, I will use the 
information from section three to construct a progressive language policy which aligns the 
desired economic, political, and social agenda of the EU and with consideration and respect for 
the sovereignty and rooted history of the individual Member States 
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Part 1: An Overview of Language in the European Union 
In the first section of this design, close attention will be paid to the fundamentals of 
language and language policy in the European Union.  Initially I will examine the languages of 
Europe to determine exactly which languages are spoken most prevalently, as well as to gain an 
understanding of language preferences among the EU populace. Following will be a section 
dedicated to understanding how the European Union has received the importance of language 
thus far. As these concepts are crucial in understanding the later developments of this design a 
continuous review of literature as it pertains to each subsection is included.  At the conclusion 
of this first section I will explore what academics have noted about the effectiveness or 
shortcomings of policy up until now. 
Ia. Languages of the EU; Prevalence and Perception 
 
 
The European Union is comprised of 27 Member States, 500 million people, 23 official 
languages, and nearly 60 other languages spoken by a total of 50 million people (EB 243, 2). As 
we will look at how language is officially incorporated into EU legal documents later on, it 
should be noted that official languages are adopted individually by the Member States and, as 
is the case with Turkish in Cypress, not every official language of a member state is necessarily 
an official language of the EU. In the case of multiple official languages, the member state must 
select which will be the working language with regard to dealings with the European Union. All 
EU sanctioned official languages are also working languages of the EU (European Commission, 
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2010). Below is a list of the members of the EU and their corresponding official language(s). 
Bold languages are not official languages of the European Union. The list is compiled from the 
Special Eurobarometer 243: Europeans and their Languages (2006) and updated accordingly for 
languages added after the accession of 2007. 
Member State Official Language(s) 
Austria German 
Belgium Dutch, French, German 
Bulgaria Bulgarian 
Cypress Turkish, Greek 
Czech Republic Czech, Slovak 
Denmark Danish 
Estonia Estonian 
Finland Finnish, Swedish 
France French 
Germany German 
Greece Greek 
Hungary Hungarian 
Ireland Irish 
Italy Italian 
Latvia Latvian 
Lithuania Lithuanian 
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Luxembourg 
Luxembourgish, French, 
German 
Malta Maltese, English 
Netherlands Dutch 
Poland Polish 
Portugal Portuguese 
Romania Romanian 
Slovakia Slovak 
Slovenia Slovene 
Spain Spanish 
Sweden Swedish 
United 
Kingdom English 
 
 
 Regional and minority languages are also prevalent across the EU. While the vast 
majority of these receive no recognition by the EU, many find themselves given status at the 
national level. A good example is Catalan and Galician in Spain, which are given an official or co-
official status in a number of the autonomous regions and are also labeled as recognized 
regional languages. Migrant languages must be accounted for as well. Languages such as 
Arabic, Hindi, Punjabi, Cantonese, Mandarin, and the Balkan languages have spread to many of 
the big cities of Europe, like London, which act as hubs for migrant communities.  
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 According to Eurobarometer (EB) 243, German is the most heavily held first language 
among EU nationals at 18%, followed by English and Italian at 13% each (7). On the other end of 
the spectrum roughly half of the official languages of the EU are each spoken by 3% or less of 
the total EU population (D48a-b).   
 When it comes to foreign language speaking in the European Union there has been a 
significant movement towards the adoption of English and German as a second language. Also 
to consider with respect to eastern enlargement is the influence of Russian. Overall the 
Eurobarometer 243 statistics demonstrated a vast improvement in Europeans’ ability to 
communicate in a non-mother tongue. Compared to the Eurobarometer 54.1 study of 2001, the 
2004 study would show an increase of 9% for competency in a second language, all the way up 
to 56% across the EU. Further, the number of EU citizens surveyed who replied they had no 
second language competency fell from 47% to 44%. Once again it should be noted that changes 
reflected over the four years may be attributed to the language knowledge of the new Member 
States. Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovakia in particular were charted in the top five among Member 
States whose citizens are able to speak conversationally in at least one foreign language (EB 
243, 8-9). 
 English is the most prevalent of the second languages held among EU citizens with 38% 
claiming at least a conversational proficiency. German and French both represent 14% of 
foreign language speakers across the continent. With respect to the study of 2001, these figures 
show an increase of 6% for English and German language ability and a 3% increase for French. 
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As mentioned previously, Russian has also emerged as a language factor in the EU.  According 
to the data 7% of EU citizens are able to hold a conversation in Russian, trumping a significant 
number of official languages (Eurobarometer 243, pg.12). 
  Combining second language competency with native language statistics, English is the 
language known by the largest number of Europeans at  51%. German is the second most 
known language across the EU at 32%, with French 3rd at 26%. Following the big three are 
Italian (16%), Spanish (15%), and Polish (10%) (D48t). 
 Mirroring many of these statistics are the thoughts and beliefs held about language by 
citizens of the European Union. When asked in the EB 243 (2006) study about the perceived 
importance of having a second language, 83% considered the acquisition useful. Over half 
deemed the possession of a foreign language very useful (27). Once again there is a noticeable 
difference that can be seen in the current data from EB 54.1 where only 72% of respondents 
considered the knowledge useful (27). This discrepancy can be in large part attributed to the 
addition of the ten new Member States. The distinction between the EU15 and the EU10, 
during which time Romania and Bulgaria were acceding countries, is a constant theme 
throughout the study as their differences in many regards are quite noticeable. 
 When it comes to which foreign language is perceived to be the most valuable, English is 
by far the top choice. Overall 68% of those surveyed replied that English was one of the two 
most important languages to learn in terms of one’s career and personal development. 
Regressing to a national level the results are even more overwhelming as English tops the ballot 
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in 26 of the 29 states surveyed**. French and German once again are the other two most 
popular selections with 25% and 22% respectively. Spanish followed at 16%. In comparison to 
the findings of EB 54.1 (2001) the divide between German and French has decreased roughly 
15%, emphasizing the new member sentiment. The high discrepancy in perceived language 
value between the EU15 and EU10 are noteworthy for some of the most common responses. In 
the context of the English language, that was not seen to be the case, however, as the results 
proved consistent with72% of the new Member States and 68% of the old selecting English 
from the list (31). Below is a chart taken from page 31 of the EB 243 (2006) study which relates 
the difference of opinions among the old and new Member States for some of the most 
commonly learned and valued foreign languages. The complete results for all nations and 
relevant languages can be found on page 32 (EB 243; 2006). 
QA2a: Which two languages, apart from your mother tongue, do you think 
are the most useful to know for your personal development and career? 
 
EB 243 / 64.3 EU10 EU15 
English 72% 68% 
German 48% 17% 
French 5% 23% 
Spanish 2% 19% 
Russian 10% 2% 
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 The chart illustrates the polarity of these preferences through the breakdown of old and 
new Member States. While this segmentation provides a great macro-level basis for analysis, it 
is not, nor is it intended to be, necessarily true at the individual member state level. Most 
important in the increasing German selection are the additions of Slovakia (61%), Slovenia 
(61%), the Czech Republic (55%), and Hungary (55%). It is no surprise that these four countries 
already possess a large number of citizens who claim proficiency in German as well as large 
German ethnic populations. The same can also be said for the perceived value of Russian in 
Latvia (54%), Lithuania (50%), and Estonia (48%) as large numbers of migrant Russian speaking 
populations live in each (EB 243, 32).   
 Since later in this study possible policy initiatives will be constructed with this very same 
concept of value in mind, it is important to ascertain what useful information we can about the 
future of language in Europe and adjust future policy accordingly. Luckily we can visit the EB 
243 (2006) study to look at further analysis and trends. In section 2.1.3 starting on page 33, 
Europeans are asked which languages their children should learn outside of their mother 
tongue. The results once again demonstrate the perceived value of English, as 77% of those 
surveyed selected the language from the list (33). Interestingly this figure is nearly 10% higher 
than the perceived utility of English for themselves in terms of personal and career 
development. If there is one consensus that can be drawn from the EB 243 study that holds 
true across both old and new Member States, it is that English is vital now, and will be 
increasingly vital in the future. In fact, English was regarded as the most important language for 
their children to learn in all but three of the Member States including the United Kingdom and 
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Ireland, where it is the native language, as well as in Luxembourg where French is the second 
official  language. The only nation surveyed which placed a greater importance on English for 
themselves than for their children was the candidate country of Turkey (33-34). Below is a chart 
I constructed which compares some of the more common responses. Statistics are taken 
directly from EB 243 (2006) pages 32 and 33. 
Perceived language utility: Personal vs. Children (%) 
Language For self (EU25) For children (EU25) 
English 68% 77% 
French 25% 33% 
German 22% 28% 
Spanish 16% 19% 
Italian 3% 2% 
Russian 3% 3% 
Chinese 2% 2% 
 
  
French and German were regarded as the second and third most valuable languages for 
children to learn at 33% and 28%, both higher than the value recorded for personal utility. 
Interestingly, Russian, while recorded at 3% for both parties, was perceived to be less important 
for children to learn than for the respondents themselves in heavily Russian influenced areas 
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like Latvia and Lithuania. The figure itself is not overwhelmingly high in and of itself, but 
understanding that Russian is not an official language, it is worthy to point out that the 3% tally 
across the EU is higher than the data would show for the majority of official languages. Overall 
the findings would suggest that language is deemed more critical in, and for, the development 
of Europe’s youth; however, the value itself seems to be filtering towards a smaller core of 
languages (EB 243, 34). 
With the variance in language and language preferences across the EU, it is no surprise 
that it has been difficult to construct policy which effectively aligns these preferences with the 
economic and political goals of Europe. With all of these variables it begs the questions: how 
does the EU intend to communicate with its subjects and vice versa? How will the language 
dynamic be managed?  In the next section, 1b, I will look at the EU and its language policy, 
promotion, and ideals thus far. 
1b. Language Policy of the EU: Aims and Programs 
 
Upon the creation of the European Economic Community (1958) through the Treaty of 
Rome, language has been acknowledged as a factor that needs to be managed. The first 
regulation adopted by the Council would reflect that belief through what would come to be 
known later as the language charter of the EU. Initially this regulation addressed which 
languages would be official and working. Dutch, French, German, and Italian were the first four, 
and the charter has been adapted to include the languages of acceding Member States (Karoly, 
131). 
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 As of 2011 there are 23 official and working languages of the European Union.  These 
provisions entitle the inhabitants of the individual Member States the right to address the EU 
institution in their native language, and receive a response in that same language. Also 
guaranteed is the translation of official EU legislation into all 23 working languages (EC, 2011). 
Each year the European Union spends roughly 300 million Euros on translation, approximately 
1% of the annual EU budget (European Commission, 2010).  Currently the responsibility for 
language policy resides with the Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture, and 
Multilingualism. 
 Language policy in the EU is very much a reflection of the underlying ideal: to function 
as one with respect for, and protection of, the sovereignty of the Member States. The official 
language policy of the European Union is multilingualism (EC, 2011); an attitude which seeks to 
enhance the lifelong learning of language, preserve the linguistic diversity of the member 
states, and foster an environment more conducive to political cooperation and economic 
success.  One important discrepancy to point out is the difference between institutional and 
noninstitutional language policy. Karoly calls to a 2006 piece by Van Els, The European Union, its 
Institutions and its Languages: Some Language Political Observations, that institutional policy 
refers to the languages which are used by, and between members of, the EU institutions while 
noninstitutional addresses the manner by which the EU can influence language learning in the 
member states (Karoly, 133). Institutionally the EU has provided the services of translators for 
communication, and citizens are able to address concerns and receive a response in their 
language, provided it’s one of the 23 official languages.  The day to day languages used by the 
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institutions varies by these institutions. For some, this is a point of contention which we will see 
later. Noninstitutionally, the EU is only able to fund language programs and make them 
available to Member State constituents.  
In reality there is no common language policy in the EU as the Member States are 
completely sovereign in that regard. Since 1992, the goal of a multi-linguistic EU is a populace 
that can speak two languages beyond their mother tongue, a vision the European Union works 
toward through various funded programs and studies. A lack of common language policy is not 
solely due to a lack of prioritization, but instead an inability to enact any legislative power. In 
this section we will look at the desired outcome of EU language policy and explore the 
programs and studies funded thus far.  
1b.1. Aims of EU Language Policy 
 The EU has limited ability in terms of enacting language policy and is therefore relegated 
to facilitating a multilingual environment and encouraging the Member States to implement 
policy on their own. The goal of a multilingual Europe is vital in all spheres pertaining to the 
progression and success of the EU. Economically, politically, and socially, language plays an 
inherent role in solidifying its ideals and identity. In the European context multilingualism is not 
only the existence of many languages, but also the possession of multiple languages by 
individuals. Thus while efforts have been a building process, the EU has consistently 
demonstrated a commitment to equality and preservation of linguistic diversity. This was 
initially manifested in funding for research on protecting regional and minority languages with 
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the Euromosaic Study (1992). Despite an evolution of policy, there have remained issues which 
are consistently reinforced, and the protection of lingual diversity is one such case. With the 
limitations of legislation, the aims of EU efforts regarding language policy are informational and 
to enhance efforts made by Member States. 
 With the further addition of Member States and languages, the EU moved towards the 
encouragement of language for personal development and reasons beneficial to the success of 
the European Union. 2001 was proclaimed the European Year of Languages by the European 
Union, UNESCO, and the European Council for this very purpose (EC, 2011).  Initiatives at the 
Member State level were intended to coincide with the declaration to bring attention to the 
importance of language at a national level. 
 In 2003 the Commission issued Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: 
An Action Plan 2004-2006 at request of the Education Council of the Member States (2). The 
plan focused on three main objectives (5.2): 
I. Life-long Language Learning: 'Mother tongue plus two other languages': 
making an early start; Language Learning in secondary education and training; 
Language Learning in Higher Education; Adult language learning; Language 
Learners with special needs; Range of languages. 
II. Better Language Teaching: The language-friendly school; The Languages 
Classroom; Language teacher training; Supply of language teachers; Training 
teachers of other subjects; Testing language skills. 
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III. Building A Language-Friendly Environment: An inclusive approach; Building 
language-friendly communities; Improving supply and take-up of language 
learning. 
Of note is the emphasis on early language education, an integral part of the Action Plan. 
The Commission also makes reference to the importance of language learning in achieving its 
goal of becoming the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, as sought by 
the Lisbon Strategy of 2000 (1).  
2005 brought A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism from the Commission. It 
was the first time multilingualism would fall within the portfolio of a Commissioner (2). The 
study reinforced earlier sentiments and defined what role the Commission would play in the 
future. It addressed three specific aims of its multilingual policy. The first was to encourage 
learning and language diversity. The second was to promote a healthy economy. And finally to 
give access to information to all members in their languages for a more informed European 
Union. A 2008 resolution from the Council, European Strategy for Multilingualism, updates the 
2005 framework and highlights further aims to stress language learning as a “cross-cutting” 
element aligning social, economics, and cultural interests(1). The new strategy asks the 
Commission to encourage Member States to “better promote multilingualism as a factor in the 
European economy’s competitiveness and people’s mobility and employment (3)”. 
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Multilingualism: as Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment was also released in 
2008 by the Commission. Similar to the “cross-cutting” function expressed before, the 
Commission offered this: 
A concerted effort is required to ensure that, within existing resources, 
multilingualism is mainstreamed across a series of EU policy areas, including 
lifelong learning, employment, social inclusion, competitiveness, culture, youth 
and civil society, research and the media. The following chapters outline key 
aspects of this inclusive approach aimed at widening the scope of 
multilingualism... (5). 
The aims of EU language policy have shifted gradually as the attempt to balance ideals 
with reality and efficiency has become more difficult. Initially the EU focused towards 
encouraging language diversity as a way of celebrating the many cultures of Europe. EU policy 
then transitioned to language as a life long learning tool to use for personal development. 
Later, policy aims of the EU would incorporate social cohesion, labor mobility and employment, 
global market competitiveness, equal access to opportunities, active political involvement, and 
even an acknowledgement that the diversity of languages can present obstacles counter to the 
ideals of the EU.  Elements of these principles, especially with regards to lifelong learning, social 
cohesion, and a mobile market, can be seen in nearly every research study designed to express 
the desires of the EU in providing an environment conducive to language learning and 
protecting diversity. 
1b.2. A Review of EU Funded Language Programs 
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 The EU funds the protection of language diversity and facilitates a multilingual 
environment in a number of ways. In section 1a. we met the Eurobarometer studies and the 
amount of information generated by EU subsidized efforts. In 1b.1, further resources were 
made available to Member States as research efforts turned into policy suggestions and action 
plans for protecting and improving the multilingual dimension of the EU in the face of rapid 
change. Also noted were the high costs of translation. However the method by which the EU is 
actively engaged with inhabitants is through its sponsored programs. 
 The most heralded of these programs operated under the umbrella of the Socrates and 
Socrates II initiatives of the European Commission and responsibility of the European 
Commission for Education, Training, Culture, and Multiculturalism (Europa.eu; 
Socrates).Socrates was established in 1995 and lasted until 1999, when it was renewed as 
Socrates II.  The Socrates program would last until 2007 when it was absorbed by the Lifelong 
Learning Program 2007-2013, still under the control of the Education, Training, Culture, and 
Multiculturalism Commission (Europa.eu; Socrates).  According  to the European Commission 
report, Many tongues, one family; Languages in the European Union (2004), approximately $30 
million Euro a year were reserved for language learning through various Socrates, and other, 
programs of the early 2000’s (12). This figure is surprisingly low however. Socrates alone 
operated on roughly a 300 million Euro budget (Europa.eu; Socrates). 
Socrates aimed to “increase mobility for students in higher education and to promote 
broad and intensive cooperation between institutions at all levels of education in every 
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Member State, and to realize their intellectual potential through the mobility of teaching staff” 
(Europa.eu; Socrates). Socrates II would expand on these principles and reformulate its aims 
(Europa.eu; Socrates II): 
 to strengthen the European dimension in education at all levels; 
 to improve knowledge of foreign languages; 
 to promote cooperation and mobility in the field of education; 
 to encourage the use of new technologies in education; 
 to promote equal opportunities in all sectors of education. 
 
 The arm of Socrates specifically for language learning was known as Lingua. Lingua had 
been established in 1990 but was integrated into Socrates upon its inception in 1995 (Eur-Lex; 
Socrates). The program  funded transnational projects incorporating both students and 
teachers to raise awareness for language diversity; encourage language learning, improve 
access to language learning, hone  language teaching techniques, and supply language students 
with a variety of learning methods (European Commission 2004; 13). To accomplish these aims, 
Lingua introduced five actions, each with a different specialization. Actions A, B, and C all 
focused on promoting aspects of language teaching. Actions D and E concentrated more on 
students’ access to teaching and language tools (Eur-Lex; Socrates). Overall 150,000 language 
learners and teachers would be affected from 1995-1999, the reign of the first Socrates. During 
that time 3,000 language teachers would receive training in lesser spoken languages (Eur-Lex; 
Socrates). In a 1997 follow up report on the first two years of the Socrates program, the 
Commission would claim these, among other results (Europa.eu; Socrates): 
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 some 80,000 young people to participate in joint projects or language 
exchanges; 
 16,000 persons to take part in continuing training courses for language 
teachers; 
 3,500 joint language teaching projects to be implemented; 
 600 transnational projects, involving 2,700 establishments, to be 
implemented with a view to improving cooperation in the fields of open and 
distance learning, adult education, intercultural education, language 
teaching and initial and continuing training for teachers. 
 
Lingua was not the only branch of Socrates which possessed a language dimension.  The 
Erasmus program, which promotes the mobility of both teachers and students, also provides 
language training to help those in transition acclimate to their new environment. The sector 
known as Grundtvig, specializing in adult education and vocational training, provided foreign 
language teaching as one of their many offerings (European Commission 2004; 13-14). 
Outside of Socrates, other Commission programs established language initiative as well. 
The Leo da Vinci program, aimed to strengthen the EU workforce through vocational training 
and education, funded transnational projects assessing the language need of businesses. The da 
Vinci program also paid for language training and the development of language tools. The 
Commission program, Culture 2000, translated over 3,000 literary works into the EU languages. 
Even the Commission’s media program had a language dimension as it funded the dubbing and 
subtitles for European films airing across the continent on TV and in the cinema (European 
Commission, 2004). 
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Without the ability to exert power in the form of legislation the EU has proven a 
commitment to funding a wide range of programs with language learning in mind. As we saw in 
1a., the EU has a diversity of native tongues, foreign language abilities, and language 
preferences. In 1b. we learned of efforts by the EU to protect linguist diversity, to facilitate 
language learning, and conduct research for the use of Member States in their sovereign 
language policies. There are some, however, who have expressed misgivings about policy, and 
in some cases, a lack of policy. In the next section we will look at theoretical framework of 
language policy as related to EU efforts, highlighting some of the most frequent criticisms. 
1c: Criticism of Policy Efforts 
 
Recently debates on the EU and promotion of certain language outcomes have become 
a point of contention for many. Robert Phillipson has become one of the more vocal members 
of a growing faction who is displeased. In his 2008 article, Is there any diversity in language 
policies national and supranational? English as a lingua franca or lingua frankensteinia?, a 
summary of a speech he gave to the European Federation of National Institutions for Language 
(EFNIL), he references numerous  officials on record discussing the pressing matter that is 
language policy debate. “There is no more emotional topic in the EU than the language issue,” 
one said. “The topic is explosive,” said another (145). Discussions on, and criticism of, EU 
language policy centers around a few key notions. First, language policy is complex and as an 
emerging discipline, knowledge of best practice is often unknown. As a result there has been a 
faulty foundation for progress and a scarcity of research and emphasis at the EU level, even 
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with its legislative constraints, which need to be addressed. Second, many believe the EU needs 
to to adopt a lingua franca in some form whether institutional or Union wide. Lastly, that 
current language policy is not only undemocratic and misleading, but that the EU has refrained 
from pursuing language policy advancements when given the opportunity. 
Karoly (2008) notes the complex situation’s origin as a product of having roots in a range 
of fields, most notably applied linguistics, sociolinguistics, and political theory. It is this from a 
lack of prior experience in these prerequisite areas which give life to bouts of information 
asymmetry. A lack of consensus on key subjects and even more so a lack of clearly defined 
terminology has led to only subtle progress in language policy reforms (126). Karoly also points 
out that in an evolving field most definitions are fluid and the scope undefined (127). Phillipson 
(2008) similarly notes a same sense of systemic confusion: 
Similarly, discussion of EU language policy is often muddled because it is unclear 
whether people are referring to different institutions, to speech or writing, to a 
document with or without legal force, to interaction between an EU institution 
and member states or citizens, etc. The term working language is used in several 
different senses. And when an EFNIL document states: ‘Linguistic diversity is an 
essential characteristic of European identity’, this is a very bold generalization to 
make about the citizens or legal systems of countries that have generally defined 
themselves monolingual for the past two centuries (147). 
 Phillipson (2008) makes a relevant point above, all while shedding light on an interesting 
topic as it pertains to this study. He references in the quote above that Member States have 
been primarily monolingual in the past and as such a forced sense of multilingual obligation is 
  
25 
 
being pushed upon them contrary to what has been, historically, pursued. It is relevant to point 
out this disconnect between EU solidification and identity ideals and the contributing cultures 
of the Member States. Perhaps more so when accessing reality and formulating future policy. 
Phillipson further addresses obstacles in creating effective supranational language policy on 
page 148-149, some of which address the aforementioned lack of foundation for improving the 
language situation: 
 there are collisions of terminology (e.g. lingua franca, multilingualism, 
working language) in discourse (politics, media, business etc), and in 
distinct academic disciplines, as well as in different countries; 
 the research community is small and scattered; 
 language policy is politically untouchable at inter-governmental level; 
 criteria for guiding equitable supranational language policy are under 
explored; 
 journalistic coverage of language issues tends to be ill-informed; 
 alternatives to market forces (the comparative advantage of English in the 
European linguistic market) and linguistic nationalism (e.g. Esperanto) are 
unexplored; 
 The final bullet above provides a nice transition into another heavily debated topic, a 
lack of an official lingua franca in the European Union. A lingua franca is best described as a 
language used to bridge communication between two parties not sharing a mother tongue. In 
the debate over the necessity of a lingua franca in the European Union a handful of options 
have emerged as policy makers decide how to decide which language(s) will be selected for use. 
The benefits of a lingua franca are concurrent with the benefits of any shared language except 
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where language is generally culturally representative.  A lingua franca is ideally used for 
communication purposes only. Whether that is possible or not, at least if selecting a living 
language, is a subsequent argument. 
Pia Vanting Christiansen’s work Language Policy in the European Union (2006) evaluates 
future lingua franca policy efforts by indexing a number of suggestions outlined by previous 
language policy analysts. The policies highlighted by Christiansen represent the diversity in 
opinions among policy proposers. Among the many blueprints cited by Christiansen is one by 
Van Els (2000), whose model seeks multiple lingua francas but with restrictions against mother 
tongue use in communication by members of the EU institutions (33). This would supposedly 
consolidate the number of languages used by EU institutions while guarding against claims of 
mother tongue privilege, a major concern for language planners (36). The eighth scenario 
evaluated was proposed by Thiong’o wa Ngugi, in his work Moving the Centre: The Struggle for 
Cultural Freedoms (1993). Ngugi argues for the use of Swahili as a lingua franca and is the only 
example I came across which offered a living language outside of the EU’s official group as a 
communicative tool. This vision will become extremely important as we move into parts three 
and four. Overall, claims of mother tongue privilege and feared contention over perceived 
language concessions can surely be attributed to a lack of movement in adopting a lingua 
franca among living languages. 
 Others have opted to promote a planned language, such as Esperanto, whose lack of 
origin appeals to those especially concerned about cultural ramifications of language policy. 
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Esperanto is a constructed language developed in 1887 by Dr. L. L. Zamenhof whose goal was to 
foster communication and shared experience through the addition of a neutral international 
language (uea.org). The language itself is of a diverse construction, adding to its appeal and 
ability to be understood according to the Universal Esperanto Association: 
Esperanto is both a spoken and a written language. Its lexicon derives primarily 
from Western European languages, while its syntax and morphology display 
strong Slavic influences. Esperanto morphemes are invariant and almost 
infinitely combinable into many different words, so the language also has much 
in common with isolating languages like Chinese, while its internal word 
structure shows similarities with agglutinative languages such as Turkish, Swahili, 
and Japanese (uea.org). 
 According to the website Esperanto has affiliate organizations in 70 nations and is well 
represented in nations such as China, Brazil, Iran, and Cuba. Esperanto also has formal relations 
with the Council of Europe and the United Nations. In the Christiansen (2006) article we’ve 
looked at there are a number of proposed language policy he indexes before concluding with 
his remarks on the feasibility of Esperanto as the lingua franca of the European Union: 
In the long term, however, the optimal policy alternative would be scenario 10, 
employing a planned language (such as Esperanto) as lingua franca and thereby 
contributing to establishing a democratic public sphere in the EU. Esperanto 
might further serve as relay language and as an internal working however, the 
optimal policy alternative would be scenario 10, employing a planned language 
(such as Esperanto) as lingua franca and thereby contributing to establishing a 
democratic public sphere in the EU. Esperanto might further serve as relay 
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language and as an internal working lingua franca and thereby contributing to 
establishing a democratic public sphere in the EU. Esperanto might further serve 
as relay language and as an internal working language for EU institutions. The 
EU’s citizens and politicians could still employ one of their own states’ official 
languages in their interaction with the Union, but speeches and documents 
would only be translated via the planned language (37-38). 
Despite a lack of official franca in the EU, scholars have observed the English language’s 
embodiment of that role in recent years. As we saw in the earlier segments of part one, English 
is the most widely spoke language in the EU, spoken the most as a second language, and is 
believed to be the most important for personal development. If languages were evaluated on a 
free market basis, unregulated and ever evolving, as is the more or less the case now, English 
would clearly be the language of choice as it has spanned the globe. Advocates of English cite 
this global dynamic alongside its flexibility and current prevalence of learning in the Member 
States. In light of these favorable characteristics, and the current cost of administrating 
translation, Anthony Pym suggests taking reality into account when weary of cultural backlash 
(8-9). Anderson et al. in, An Administrative Lingua Franca within the EU (1997), assumes English 
to be the best of all choices, while acknowledging no one perfect solution, for an administrative 
lingua franca. This should be highlighted for an administrative lingua franca would not beset 
directives on the Member States, but instead merely consolidate the working languages of EU 
institutions (7). Opponents of English as an official lingua franca cite the advantage that mother 
tongue speakers would have over non natives among the more common fears of linguicide and 
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language imperialism. The realities which Pym and other have brought to light are equally 
troublesome for another sect which is already dissatisfied with the hypocrisy of current policy. 
 The most overwhelming criticism of current policy comes from those who believe that 
the current system is a facade, allowing for the dominance of a select few languages while 
oppressing the rest. Robert Phillipson (2008) is one in particular who has been very critical of 
the emergence of English as a de facto lingua franca and the effect it has had on other Union 
languages: 
There is a largely uncritical adoption of englishisation, English as the lingua 
economica/Americana. There is a rhetoric of language rights, some national and 
supranational implementation, advocacy of linguistic diversity, but much is left 
to market forces. States differ constitutionally (unitary, federal), in their cultures 
and educational philosophy (Bildung, skills …) and in the extent to which they 
support minority languages (149). 
 
 Phillipson goes as far to say that the dominance of English is a factor of “EU 
subordination of US global ambitions” (150). While this may be somewhat dramatic, dissent 
from more level headed critics of the illusionary democratic language policy illustrate problems 
far more grounded in facts. Christiansen (2006) writes on several of these undemocratic 
processes as he alludes to the exclusivity of a small group of languages when it comes to certain 
newsletters, speech transcriptions, and information on language learning programs (29). 
Looking at the working languages of EU institutions, Karoly (2008) conveys the common use of 
only a few languages. The European Commission, for example, works in English, French, and 
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German. The Central Bank works only in English, and the Court of Justice only in French (132). 
Ahn (2007) suggests that EU language policy efforts are nothing more than symbolic. And 
perhaps it is true. In all retrospect the product of multilingualism is a designation of an official 
language by the member state for use EU wide. That is inherently counter to multilingualism as 
a side effect since it promotes a single language nationally. Phillipson (2008) once again is 
dissatisfied as funding for regional and minority languages have steadily decreased. He also 
raises the valid point of whether or not a proclaimed democratic and multilingual language 
policy can be called as such when there has been no commitment to translate into all languages 
(150, 152). 
Phillipson (2008) asserts that misnomers surrounding the notion of democratic language 
policy are nothing new. He cites a dispute between whether to work in the German or Finnish 
language at an inter-ministerial meeting where the size of the German language out-muscled its 
smaller opponent even during the reign of a Finnish President (146). Further, he alluded that 
despite a shortage of legislative power, the EU has come up short when addressed on the 
possibility of strengthening language policy efforts. The European Parliament and Commission 
have had the opportunity to endorse a more innovative approach to the Framework Strategy 
for Multilingualism (2005), as well as support a new language agency in the commission, were 
rejected.  
In part four we will look back at some of these common concerns around language 
policy, language selection, and a potential lingua franca in Europe, as the information is 
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considered for the purpose of my policy proposals. Next, in part two, language, labor mobility, 
and the idea of an optimum currency area (OCA) will be evaluated.  
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PART II: Language, Labor Mobility, and OCA’s 
 
 In part one various fundamentals for understanding the complex language dynamic in 
Europe were displayed, intending to provide the reader with an array of information regarding 
the languages spoken and learning preferences, as well as policy efforts and the general 
popular sentiment. At this time a look at EU integration efforts and how they are affected by 
language barriers will be examined. To do this, it would be possible to focus our efforts on a 
number of situations and assess how language either helped or hurt the EU prototype. One 
such example would be to look at political activity, mainly voting habits of nationals during EU 
elections. A difference between national and EU elections might be seen in terms of a 
disconnect between inhabitants and the European Union, a lack of relevant information 
dispersed, or lack of inter-Member civil discourse, all of which are highlighted by language 
differences.   
  For the purpose of this research design, however, I will look at the theory behind 
economic integration in the European Union, especially the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
as I examine language and labor mobility, and the concept of an optimum currency area (OCA). 
Before analysis in that realm it is important to become more familiar with the EMU itself.  
 The European Monetary Union was the natural progression of economic and political 
integration and was created, through a building block type process, as the work of the Delors 
Commission, named for its architect and President of the European Commission, Jacques 
Delors. This commission initially formulated timetables for integration, discussed the reality of a 
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European system of central banking, examined necessary convergence criteria, and proposed a 
single European currency in the late 1980’s. The Delors Report was released in 1989, and 
proposed a European Monetary Union that would evolve over three stages (European 
Commission: History of EMU).  
The first stage involved the full liberalization of capital across Member States and 
established convergence criteria regarding ideal national debt, deficit, and currency stability. 
The initial period would go into effect in July of 1990, and the EMU would become part of EU 
law officially upon the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and its ratification in 1993 
(European Commission: History of EMU).  
The second stage came into effect at the onset of 1994 and implemented various 
policies in moving towards the eventual goal of a common currency, including the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI), the precursor to the European Central Bank (ECB), which would 
replace the EMI in 1998. During the second stage the excessive deficit procedure, a predecessor 
and compliment to the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997, would also be enacted to streamline 
macroeconomic principles across Member State economies setting standards for national debt 
and deficit in relation to GDP (European Commission: History of EMU).  
 The third and final stage would begin in January of 1999 with the introduction of the 
Euro, an effective beginning to a realized EMU. The first three years would be a period for 
adjustment and monitoring, without the actual use of the currency in the Member States. The 
Euro did replace the European Currency Unit, a currency basket previously used for accounting 
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within the Member States. In 2002 the Euro currency would enter circulation in the twelve 
Member States who were part of the EMU. The Euro is now used in seventeen Member States, 
known as the Eurozone (European Commission: The Euro). 
 With the creation of the EMU and fulfillment of its objective in creating a common 
currency it begs the question, for what benefits? Our look at tangible language barriers, and 
thus a need for more innovative policy, begins with the model behind the EMU, the theory of 
an optimum currency area. 
2a. What is an Optimum Currency Area? 
 For the sake of simplicity, we will define an optimum currency area (OCA), sometimes 
referred to as an optimal currency area, as a region whose economic efforts would be 
maximized through the adoption of a single currency. Under this definition it is possible that a 
nation could be part of a larger currency area, and at the same time one nation could be made 
up of several smaller currency areas. Robert Mundell first brought to light the idea of an of 
optimum currency area in his appropriately named piece, “A Theory of Optimum Currency 
Areas”, published in 1961. The work is timely in its recognition of emerging economic 
integration and future possibilities. In addressing the need for such a study:  
Certain parts of the world are undergoing processes of economic integration and 
disintegration, new experiments are being made, and a conception of what 
constitutes an optimal currency area can clarify the meanings of these 
experiments (657). 
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Mundell again makes reference to the evolving European economic community when he 
wonders, “supposing the Common Market countries proceed with their plans for an economic 
union, should these countries allow each national currency to fluctuate, or would a single 
currency be preferable? (657).”  The foundation of Mundell’s theory is based upon the idea that 
a combination of internally fixed and externally floating exchange rates would allow for a 
central banking system that can manage both employment and inflation where conditions are 
sufficient. Mundell argued that under current systems, one where areas are comprised of 
different national currencies, surplus countries can benefits from leveling prices at the burden 
of unemployment in the deficit countries (659). In the context of a fixed exchanged rate over all 
currency areas, full employment comes as an inflationary liability (659). It is for these reasons 
that, where conditions are optimal, a currency area displaying a fixed exchange intra-regionally 
while floating its currency against other currencies on a global level could enhance the overall 
economic activity.  Any support for a flexible exchange system should be inspired by a regional 
currency, not a national one, understanding that a region is defined by factor mobility within 
and factor immobility outside could span many nations, be the size of a nation, or be one of 
multiple currency areas within a nation. A currency area whose economies would benefits from 
more from the adoption of a uniform note more than it would suffer from the lack of control 
over internal adjustment is, as Mundell alludes to on page 660, what constitutes an optimum 
currency area.  
Luca Ricci looks in depth at this cost benefit issue in her work, A Model of an Optimum 
Currency Area, written in 2008 for the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  On the subject of 
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costs incurred by moving away from having separate flexible exchange rates, Ricci notes that 
flexible exchange rates can be effective in the short term in adjusting to asymmetric shocks, 
especially when domestic prices are not fully flexible and pass through is limited (2).  Also noted 
is that often the alternative mechanisms for adjustment, such as labor mobility, can be difficult 
in assessing its cost and feasibility, thus making the transition from multiple floating currencies 
to a single fixed currency within an area risky (2). Ricci also points to Bofinger (1994), whose 
analysis contends that asymmetric monetary shocks and disparities in domestic inflation levels 
are to be considered at the level of other criterion in assessing whether or not a currency area 
can be considered an OCA (Ricci, 3). As far as the benefits to adopting a single currency, Ricci 
references Mundell (1961) for a foundation. The benefits to adopting a single currency when 
conditions are optimal are plenty. Elimination of transaction costs and deadweight, more 
efficient accounting, and the elimination of uncertainty are among the most heavily cited (3). 
Deadweight refers to the money lost in an exchange transaction to fees or spread, and can 
become extremely costly when involved in large financial transactions. Certainly the mobility of 
capital as a criterion for an OCA, as we will see shortly, can be tied in here as well. In terms of 
reliable accounting, it is perhaps the largest beneficiary of a reduction in monetary value 
uncertainty, as Ricci references on page three. 
The question then becomes how to define optimum criteria, that is, how to define the 
necessary conditions for a currency area to necessitate a single currency. Mundell (1961) 
believes it is this question which is the most important, as the case of OCA’s are matters of fit, 
not a matter of theoretical existence. While other authors would focus the benefits of optimum 
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currency areas around enhancements to trade and reduced transaction costs, Mundell 
introduced the OCA as a stability mechanism. He first makes the assumption that economic 
integration must follow political integration, and as currencies have been attributed to national 
sovereignty in the past, it his belief that only a transitioning area would have the platform for 
such an economic reorganization. He also refers to necessary conditions of high labor and 
capital mobility, and points at the damage which can be done when regions with high factor 
mobility and similar business cycles operate on separate national currencies (664).  
Over the next generations, and as economic integration led to more favorable 
conditions for the adoption of a single currency in multinational regions, further studies and 
developments of OCA’s became prevalent. Nowhere is this illustrated more than Frankl and 
Rose’s 1997 title, The Endogenity of Optimum Currency Area Criteria. The paper reflects thirty 
years of data collected by the authors and demonstrates how optimal factors are largely an 
output of existence within the system. In the case of their data, a study of EU member states 
awaiting the introduction of the Euro, integration had already been seen to produce a 
correlation between trade integration and similar business cycles among nations, reinforcing 
Mundell’s belief that nations integration prior to the adoption of a single currency would be 
favorable, yet also differing in that their existence in the Common Market had facilitated the 
two criteria conditions and were not preexistent to successful integration. In their assessment 
of the OCA paradigm, Frankl and Rose index the optimal criteria for a single currency area as 
established by Mundell and other OCA developers over the previous 30 years.  While their 
study only looks at the relationship between the first two, Frankl and Rose cite four criteria 
  
38 
 
which members of a region must share for it to be considered an OCA, and thus beneficiaries of 
the reduced costs of a single currency (3): 
1. High Extent of Trade and Capital Mobility  
2. Similarity of Shocks and Cycle  
3. High Degree of Labor Mobility 
4. Existence of a Risk Sharing System for Financial Transfers 
 Another often-sighted criterion is product diversification among Member States (Kenan, 
1969). When looking at the list of criteria, it is possible to see where language might have an 
impact on the functioning of a currency area, especially within bullets one and three. Important 
to remember as well is Mundell’s assertion that monetary unions that do not match the criteria 
of an OCA would be better off as separate currency areas based on internal factor mobility, 
external factor immobility, and a floating exchange rate (664). As we move forward and refocus 
on language implications, labor mobility and trade in the EU will be examined in depth with an 
emphasis on the importance of language policy in fulfilling the criteria of an OCA, and thus 
enhancing the utility of Eurozone membership.  
2b. Language and Labor Mobility in the EU 
 In part one we looked at a number of studies done by the European Union institutions, 
as well as their funded programs, for the enhancement of language speaking throughout the 
European Union. Common in both the suggestions and aims of the studies, as well as the 
objectives of their programs, were to enhance labor mobility in the EU. We also saw that as 
time moved forward an increasingly larger emphasis was put on language as a tool for the 
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economic success of the European Union. Addressing Mundell’s (1961) criterion for an 
optimum currency area, the economic theory behind the development of the EMU, it is no 
surprise that we see labor mobility listed. As Ricci (2008) would tell us later, these factors 
combine to determine the costs and gains of moving towards a single currency (2). 
  With that in mind, we must discuss the importance of common language for labor 
mobility. As studies of this kind are not fully developed at this point, quantitative data 
correlating language and mobility patterns is difficult to find. Nevertheless, in almost any study 
or research on labor mobility, inhabitants will site language difference, sometimes as part of a 
larger cultural theme, as one of the main barriers. The transferability of certifications and 
qualifications can be made difficult. Finding jobs through a medium that is available in one’s 
language may also be nearly impossible.  Preoccupation over the signing of legal and financial 
documents may also be a possible deterrent of leaving one’s nation, intensified by the 
unfamiliarity of a new language. These are among the many reoccurring themes. 
 In 2002, the European Commission conducted a study similar to those EU studies we 
examined in part one.  Titled The Action Plan For Skills and Mobility, this study listed language 
differences as a main factor to low labor mobility in the EU (10).  Pavan (2004) echoes those 
sentiments in Labor Mobility in the EU.  He lists language differences as one of the eight main 
barriers (4). From a brief glance at the remainder of his list, it appears that language could play 
a large part in the complexity and uncertainty of at least a few of the other listed obstructions. 
Pertinent to our study, and a point made early on, is the integration of economics and politics 
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at the assumed expense of culture and the hesitancy of the EU to ask for cultural concessions 
when applicable. Shah and Long (2007), in, Labour mobility and the mutual recognition of skills 
and qualifications: European Union and Austria, mirrors this assertion: 
Differences in culture and language add diversity and richness to European 
societies but they are also significant barriers to labour mobility. In spite of an 
increasing number of EU citizens who are multi-lingual, language is still one of 
the most significant barriers to mobility...The answers to these questions 
[regarding language solutions] are complex given the very high priority that the 
European Commission places on the protection of all European languages and 
the importance of the national identity through language for each member state 
(5). 
 Di Gessel and Janssen (2000) study regional labor mobility at the German and Dutch 
border. Findings conclude that when all other obstacles subside, including personal motivation, 
the lingual barriers and cultural ties persist, keeping mobility low (74). Peixoto (2002) offers a 
similar conclusion from his study regarding the mobility of more highly educated and highly 
skilled workers in the EU.  His findings demonstrate that even where administrative and skill 
recognition problems have been abolished, the issue of language still looms large (Peixoto, 44).  
Thunnissen (2010), covered below, notes that language adds a significant cost to the 
investment personified by a transnational move. In his cost benefit analysis, language proves a 
large cost and a negative externality to mobility (XX).  Tassinopoulos and Werner (1999) argue 
that the current scarcity of labor mobility in the EU has very little to do with the bureaucratic 
and legal fears that are often perceived to influence nationals to stay home. Instead, the lingual 
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and cultural aspects have now emerged at the top of the list (XX).  Thunnissen (2010) 
references Linda Hantrais (2007), who found that the deterioration of all other obstacles 
through political and economic integration had not led to an increase in cross border mobility. 
This displays, almost by default, a disregard of persisting cultural and lingual forces that often 
prevent adjustment (Thunnissen, 2010: 36). 
Knowing that language plays a significant role in labor mobility, to what degree is labor 
mobile in the European Union?  Language skills are weak for working aged Europeans, and as 
language is often cited as a main barrier, we would expect that labor mobility in the EU would 
be low as well. In this case the logical conclusion is also the correct one as EU labor mobility is 
by all accounts, low.  When addressing the conditions of Western Europe in legitimizing an OCA, 
Mundell (1961) listed low levels of labor mobility as a reason for its poor fit (661).  Barry 
Eichengreen (1991) writes in his paper, Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?, that Europe does 
not represent an OCA and cites labor mobility as a significant factor, lagging far behind the 
mobility of workers in the USA (24).  
In the theory of OCA’s, the movement towards a single currency is inspired by the ability 
of its factors to adjust to economic disturbances, thus relinquishing the need to float separate 
currency against neighbors.  Cavelaars and Hessel (2007) examine labor mobility as a regional 
adjustment mechanism, and findings are concurrent with the consensus of low overall mobility 
within the European Union (3). Their most important finding, however, is that labor mobility in 
the EU has not generally been driven by economic differences, and thus hasn’t acted as an 
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adjustment mechanism (5). According to their data of selected areas, migration after one year 
was only three percent of the unemployment difference between these areas (5).  More 
pertinent findings from Cavelaars and Hessel (2007) on overall data collected from the 38 
measured regions from 1996 until 1999: 
Gross migration flows between regions in the same country are in the order of 
1.5 to 2% of population, depending on whether the UK regions (for which no 
cross-border migration data are available) are included. See Table 1. 
International arrivals are 0.6% of the population. Based on another source, we 
estimate that around 75% of international arrivals are from outside the 
European Union, implying that migration between EU countries amounts to only 
0.15% of population (Regional Labour Mobility in the European Union: 
Adjustment Mechanism or Disturbance?, 3). 
Extrapolating on the lack of national mobility, as portrayed by the 1.5 to 2% statistic 
displayed above, arguments that legal and administrative barriers are no longer restricting 
mobility to an abnormal extent are at least partially negated. This, of course, assumes that 
cultural and lingual barriers do not pose serious concern for national mobility, an assumption 
that arguably has its shortcomings.  
A 2002 study by the European Commission, Commission’s Action Plan for skills and 
mobility, centers around low occupational and geographic mobility and its detriment to the 
Union both economically and socially. The EC found that in 2000, 0.1 percent of the population 
changed residences to another Member State. Thunnissen (2010) references a similar low 
figure taken from Employment in Europe 2009, another European Commission publication. 
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According to the 2009 study, only 2% of EU nationals work in another Member State 
(Thunnissen, 26).   
 Referenced above, Simon Thunnissen provides us with Labor Mobility in the EU: An 
Analysis of the Barriers to the Free Movement of Labor in the EU, in 2010. While Thunnissen 
finds language to be among the most active contributors to an immobile EU labor force (13), his 
findings on labor mobility within the EU are strikingly low. Thunnissen uses information 
generated by Eurostat for the European Commission in 2006 to provide a very useful chart on 
the percentage of labor force comprised of nationals, other EU nationals, and nationals outside 
the EU (27).  According to labor force statistics in 2005, outside of Luxembourg, no EU country 
had more than six percent of its working age residents represented by other EU nations. One 
other noticeable characteristic is that the percentage of residents from outside the EU is 
frequently four to five times larger, and sometimes higher, than the percentage of other EU 
nationals (27).  Related to language, Thunnissen (2010) also references Tassinopoulos and 
Werner (1999), who argue that the current scarcity of labor mobility in the EU has very little to 
do with the bureaucratic and legal fears often perceived to influence nationals to stay home.  
Instead, it is the lingual and cultural aspects that have now emerged at the top of the list 
(Thunnissen, 34).   
 As we conclude section two of this study we have seen the economic theory behind 
monetary unions during our look at optimum currency areas.  We also saw the importance of 
labor mobility to the performance of an OCA during the analysis of OCA criterion.  Further 
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information related to the importance of language in enhancing labor mobility, while looking at 
labor mobility within the European Union, was presented.  It is important to remember that 
high labor mobility is not the only characteristic of an optimum currency area, very much in the 
same way that language barriers are not the only obstacles to labor mobility.  Linda Hantrais, 
who was referenced earlier by Thunnissen (2010), examines labor mobility and finds six 
remaining contributors to restricted EU labor mobility on page 220 of her piece, Social Policy in 
the European Union (2007); 
1. Lack of transferability of social security rights 
2. education, training, and recruitment 
3. job information and access to employment 
4. public sector employment 
5. language and culture 
6. personal and family reasons  
 Despite this list of inhibitors, Hantais concedes that the persisting problems have more 
to do with lingering cultural and lingual barriers as others have eroded (224).  Even looking at 
the other criterion, how many of them would be made easier with common language in some 
capacity?  Certainly access to employment would be dramatically increased. In regard to 
pension transferability, is it possible that language merely restricts workers’ abilities to gather 
all the necessary information?  As mentioned directly above, access to information is already 
listed criterion, so perhaps language acts more as a spiraling effect encompassing a number of 
contexts. Treating language as a solitary actor is negligent of the trickle down effect it has into 
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other areas.  At the same time, it is not the assertion of this thesis that the elimination of 
language barriers will inherently seal all other cracks.  
In sections three and four this information will be important to keep in mind as language 
value in a global context is examined. In order to construct relevant and progressive EU 
language policy it is important to have an understanding of which languages are the most 
relevant around the globe. In part three I will introduce both The Language Value Index, as well 
as the Future Language Production Formula in the hopes of using the information derived to 
inspire a more dynamic EU language policy in the future. A proposal designed specifically for 
the objectives of the European Union is the basis of section four. 
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Part 3: Models for Language Value and Future Production 
 If, in theory, the European Union were given the ability by Member States to streamline 
language policy with the goals of economic and political integration, a uniform second language 
would be ideal for a more efficient EMU. The first step would naturally involve coming to a 
consensus regarding which language to promote. Voices on language selection for a potential 
lingua franca have certainly been heard, and there seems to be a disconnect between actual 
preferences and the intense fear of cultural backlash when concessions of any kind are 
proposed in that realm. Similarly, the EU has been accused of lacking initiative when granted an 
opportunity to make an impact by the Member States. 
 Now let’s pretend that cultural barriers to legislation are nonexistent and thus there is 
no objection to an efficiency based language solution. Which language then would be the most 
optimal solution, or, which languages would be most preferable to teach as a second language?  
Even if the EU were granted no such ability to legislate, which languages might be ideal for 
individual Member States to incorporate into their language policies?  Assuming there is a way 
of creating a hierarchy of languages based on objective criteria for creating policy from a purely 
economic standpoint, how might one go about assessing value? These questions act as a basis 
for the two models I have created:  The Language Value Index, and The Language Production 
Formula.  
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3a. Purpose 
Through my research I had seen no quantitative way of determining the economic 
impact of global language populations and it is my goal that the model will allow for further 
discussion and interest in the subject, creating more open-minded and innovative ideas for the 
creation of future policy. It is my hope that through this analysis, people will expand their 
capacity to think of language as a way of mobilizing citizens, mitigating risk, and establishing 
worthwhile relationships globally.  The Language Value Index is a way of comparing different 
language worlds against each other, analyzed from a number of standpoints to be seen and 
judged individually. On the other hand, The Language Production Formula is a way of looking at 
output against population and modified through other measurements. These models are not 
meant to prove which language worlds are necessarily most dominant in size or sheer 
production, but instead which are the best fits for the inclusion in policy based on economic 
goals, and to an extent, reality as well.  Knowledge of a foreign language is a perquisite to 
international mobility and thus key in the solidification of an efficient EMU whose adjustments 
mechanisms must outperform the downsides to an internally fixed, externally floated rate. The 
purpose of the models I have created is in understanding language value for the inclusion in EU 
policy to be seen in part four. In the modern global climate it is imperative that new ways of 
thinking about language policy are explored, even if that means challenging some of the more 
commonly held notions of right and wrong within the discipline.       
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3b. Methodology 1: Definitions and Variables 
 Determining the manner in which languages would be assessed value for their global 
relevancy centers around three main factors. First, language value must consider the size of the 
language populace, taking into account the scope of territory the language reaches. Second, 
production of the language population is of utmost importance and must be viewed as a high 
priority. Finally, the quality of the institutions and access to partnerships within language 
populations must be evaluated at some level.  In this study, quantitative measures are used to 
answer qualitatively focused questions centered on how to assess language value for selection 
in future policy. 
 In the models I use language world to mean the collective nations where the given 
language is considered an official language. Understanding this is pertinent to the rest of the 
study as the term is used frequently, and in the model as well. To collect data for the Language 
Value Index and Production Formula I decided on seven measurables which would be used to 
assess the eight languages chosen to study. The categories: 
1. Population Base 
2. Population Growth 
3. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
4. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
5. Literacy 
6. Index of Economic Freedom 
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7. Global Reach  
 
 1) Population base should not be confused with the number of total language speakers. 
Using population base instead of the total number of speakers allows one to incorporate the 
capacity to which a language is supported by institutions and accessible under the rule of law. 
2) Concurrently, population growth is measured across each nation, and then averaged across 
the entire language world. 3) Gross domestic product (GDP) acts as a collective measurement of 
economic output across an entire language speaking population by totaling the GDP amounts of 
the individual nations. GDP differs from gross national product (GNP) in that companies owned 
by foreign investors on home soil are counted, whereas GNP referrers to production in terms of 
ownership and not physical location. GDP can be described as the total value of goods and 
services produced within national boundaries measured over a given time. When coupled with 
high FDI rates, figures should indicate favorable settings to invest, as well as be indicative of a 
language world who is investing globally. 4) FDI provides information on which language 
nations are harboring, and providing, the greatest amount of international investment. Once 
again this should reinforce the effects of national institutions in dictating economic activity. This 
is because of the dual nature of FDI which measures both inflow and outflow and combines into 
a single figure measured as a collected stock worldwide. 5) Literacy is important in determining 
the capabilities of the population bases to be productive and engage in mutually benEFIcial 
relationships. It also speaks to the quality of government educational systems. 6)  Finally, the 
Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) is used to emphasize the importance of strong institutions and 
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favorable conditions within areas. The IEF was created by The Heritage Foundation and 
measures 10 different economic areas from corruption and government spending to business 
and monetary freedom (heritage.org). It is my estimation that the IEF is a good representation 
of sustainability in terms of infrastructure. A nation with a strong IEF rating is assumed to 
provide conditions necessary for attracting investment and a higher standard of living. 7) The 
global reach measurement is merely the number of continents where the language is official 
over the total number of continents excluding Antarctica.  For the purposes of the Language 
Production Formula I created a statistic representing the total stock of FDI by a language world 
over its collective annual GDP. 
I chose eight language populations to assess using these variables, and in the case of the 
Future Language Production Model, fixed variables as well over a given time period. The eight 
languages I selected were based upon both application within the European Union and current 
global significance. The languages selected are wide in their reach, with all six populated 
continents in play. On one hand we look at English, which is represented on multiple continents 
and over 30 nations, and at the same time we look at Mandarin and Hindi which are very 
centrally located but who possess other intricacies appealing for possible language inclusion in 
policy. The eight language worlds used to test the models were: 
1. English 
2. Mandarin 
3. Hindi  
4. Arabic 
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5. German 
6. French 
7. Spanish 
8. Russian 
Each language world was evaluated in each nation where it is official and examined in 
terms of each of the variables.  More than 130 nations were represented by the eight language 
worlds. For figures that were unknown, the average of the rest of the language world was used, 
except within FDI where a lower total was assigned based on similar nations in terms of GDP 
and IEF.  
If committed to an equitable policy where one evaluates language worlds in terms of 
GDP, FDI, population base, economic freedom, literacy, and so on, then perhaps we can 
determine which languages are best to integrate in policy based on facilitating investment 
opportunities, mobility, and logistics. Large collective population bases allow us to see the 
greatest number of people living where the language is protected under law, by institutions, 
and access to government in that language is guaranteed. Where FDI is strong, money is 
flowing in and moving out, and thus language can act as a way of both attracting, and offering, 
potential investment.  Further, the ability to do business in the language of a flourishing area 
allows for a competitive advantage and a reduction in costs. The IEF stats allow us to 
incorporate sound institutions and infrastructure. A language world with a higher IEF means 
more nations who have favorable conditions and thus are more likely to be a partner in some 
way, shape, or form. It is also possible to see IEF as a quasi-measure of sustainability. Language 
  
52 
 
worlds with an overall high GDP may signal, when coupled with high IEF and literacy, the most 
attractive language to learn based on the most number of outlets for mobility and investment.  
At the same time a language world with high literacy rates offers a network of specialized labor 
in diversified industries and whose land mass harbors different resources to explore, especially 
among those whose nations are distributed across multiple continents.  For governments, using 
language as a tool of attraction allows for less of a dependence on domestic markets in terms of 
keeping people employed and capital coming in. Consider a South American nation, for 
example, Chile, who decides to learn French as a 2nd language. Not only does Chile now have 
access to two major EU markets, France and Spain, but she may also explore development 
partnerships in Africa and Canada with sizeable leverage and minimized costs. In part four, a 
language policy with these factors in mind will be tailored to the European Union.  
 
3c. Methodology II: Modeling 
Language Value Index 
 The Language Value Index is a point system I created to assess current language value 
based on the aforementioned seven variables. The system is based on the hierarchy of 
languages in each measured area, with the highest value given the highest total of points in 
that section. Over 130 countries from eight languages worlds were measured and compiled to 
come up with a total value across the eight populations. The breakdown of points is as follows; 
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 FDI ($ 
billions) 
GDP ($ 
billions)  
IEF (%)  Literacy 
(%)  
Population 
Base 
Pop 
Growth 
(%) 
Global 
Reach 
(x/6) 
Min/max 
and total 
1st 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 54 max 
2nd  6 6 6 6 6 5 5  
3rd 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  
4th 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  
5th 3 3 3 3 3 2 2  
6th 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
7th 2 2 2 2 2 1 1  
8th 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 min 
Total 
points 
30 30 30 30 30 25 25 =200 
 
 In the case of ties, the points for the relevant positions will be totaled and split evenly. 
The index is useful as a simple measurement technique looking at the measures separately and 
then combining the value into one. No single variable is pit against another, and high values 
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across the board are concretely beneficial. But what if we were interested in looking at 
production per capita, with figures being strengthened or weakened by the interplay of other 
factors? At the same time, could one use such a model to see which languages would be the 
most advantageous l to learn in the future based on these interactions between production, 
outlets, and conditions? With the Future Language Production Formula I attempt to satisfy 
these questions.  
Future Language Production Formula 
 Using the initial idea of weighted production divided by weighted population I wanted 
to see how each language world stacked up against one another in terms of a GDP per capita 
type statistic. The outcome is useful in language adoption for policy purposes from an economic 
standpoint. It should be acknowledged that this is not intended to be the sole determiner of 
which language is necessarily best. Instead it is one piece of information to be considered 
alongside the realities and preferences of the state or collective body.  Using the same variables 
and data from above I express language production per capita through the following equation: 
FLP(x) ={ [Bbt + (Cct x G)] x E } x F  
                 [Aat x D]        
 
 Where: 
 
Variable Statistic Expressed as 
FLP(x) Future per capita 
production of language 
world (x) 
See above 
x Language world x = ∑xi 
B GDP B(x) = ∑Bi 
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b GDP growth (fixed) % 
C FDI C(x) = ∑Ci 
c FDI growth (fixed) % 
A Population Base A(x) = ∑Ai 
a Population Growth (%) a(x) = ∑ai / xin 
D Converted Literacy D(x) = 1 + ∑ (100 – Di) 
xin  
E IEF (0-100) % 
F Global Reach F(x)= .7 + (.05xz) 
G FDI as % of GDP G(x) = C(x) / B(x) 
i Individual country of 
language world (x) 
(x)i 
n Total number of 
nations represented in 
language world (x) 
(x)in 
 t Time (years)  (0, 1...2...3) 
z Continents reached by 
language world (x) 
(x)z 
 
 Looking more closely at the model we see a measure of production and investment on 
top, with population in the denominator. Variables E and F are a matter of weakening, or 
strengthening through minimal weakening comparatively, the operations on the left side of the 
formula. The higher the IEF (E) total and wider the Global Reach (F) the more the value remains 
the same. Low averages across E and F in language worlds subject the total value to significant 
reduction. The majority of the expressions are straightforward; however a few clarifications 
should be made. First, variables b and c are fixed growth figures for time (t) to see how the 
results change when plugging in various rates. Second, converted literacy, variable D, is 
expressed as a figure greater than one so that populations which have low literacy rates are 
subject to a higher multiplier in the denominator, thus reducing their production per capita 
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figures. High literacy has the opposite effect, promising a minimal multiplier and thus a higher 
production per capita total. Some may wonder why FDI is calculated alongside GDP when the 
figure should be encompassed, at least in terms of inward flow, by the GDP statistic. This is 
done to curb high production figures where institutional barriers would prevent common 
language from achieving the desired outcomes.   
 The overall numbers produced are similar figures to GDP per capita across the entire 
language world, except for reasserting an FDI on top of GDP, and modified by the depth of 
skilled labor (literacy) and quality of their institutions and collective domestic conditions (IEF). It 
is my assertion that languages which finish at the top are the most attractive to align with in 
policy moving forward. At the same time, certain attributes of language worlds, as we will see 
in the index, may be appealing for deciding on policy even if the overall total isn’t remarkably 
high. This is where the Language Index can be most helpful. 
 Automating the equation, in this instance in Microsoft Excel, allowed me to manipulate 
the growth rates and time values to see how the values would respond in the future should 
simulations be accurate. Since some nations have multiple official languages, and some 
continents heavily influenced by multiple official languages of interest in this study, I wanted to 
look at varied growth according to plausible future events to see how the languages involved 
are influenced. Africa, for example, is home to a significant number of nations where either 
English, Arabic, French, or a combination of the three hold official status.  Significant growth 
and development in Africa is going to have an impact on these languages and can be simulated 
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to see how they react in relation to languages that are not relevant at this point within that 
specific continent. The model that I have created is quite extensive in its capabilities, however 
due to time constrains there is no way for me to explore the majority of the possibilities. I am 
hopeful that further research based on these concepts will be explored in solidifying the 
necessity for studies on the importance of language policy. Keep in mind that data is to be used 
to enhance language policy efforts for a fully functioning EMU as will be proposed in part four. 
 
3d. Data and Analysis 
 Below are the results after incorporating the data of over 130 countries into the two 
methods I developed in assessing language value. The Language Value Index results in their 
entirety are displayed below with a breakdown by criterion and subsequent totaling. In regards 
to the Future Language Production Formula, I ran two separate tests to see how production 
would react to different rates of growth, as well as how it would match up against the index. 
This is in addition to generating current production levels by eliminating the fixed growth 
variables for GDP (b) and FDI (c), and time (t). Despite the formulas intent on looking at per 
capita figures across each language world, it will be interesting to see if the index rankings are 
in line with the formulas interpretation in the absence of rates for growth and time. For a look 
at the complete set of data please refer to the full list of statistics in the appendix following the 
conclusion of the study. It is important to remember that at this stage the data has been 
compiled into a solid figure representing the language worlds in their entirety. All of the 
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information which follows has been taken directly from the CIA’s, The World Factbook, which is 
accessible directly through the CIA’s main page (www.cia.gov: Publications, The World 
Factbook).  The one exception is with regards to the Index of Economic Freedom developed by 
the Heritage Foundation with the partnership of The Wall Street Journal (www.heritage.org). 
Within the CIA’s Factbook resides information on every nation in the world across different 
sectors ranging from their economies and energy consumption patterns to transportation 
infrastructure and number of internet users. Data was based on 2010 figures, with GDP 
measured in terms of purchasing power parity. 
3d.1. Language Value Index  
 To see how a total was reached a complete breakdown of the results based on the 
criteria is displayed below. The total figures are provided following the dissection. 
Population Base 
 As noted previously, this is not an accurate number of language speakers but more of a 
ceiling instead. A large base not only assumedly provides more actual speakers, but in many 
cases a diversity of outlets in various geopolitical settings and thus a multitude of possible 
investment and developmental opportunities. It tells us where people are likely learning the 
language as well. Further with official status comes generally a working capacity as well which 
may eliminate many of the institutional and administrative barriers perceived to be a barrier to 
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mobility and trade. The same can be said for the deterioration of legal hindrances where 
governments and institutions are accessible in the specific language. 
 
 With roughly 2.65 billion people English has the largest language base in the world and 
nearly double that of the next largest, Mandarin. Hindi is the only other language which 
surpasses a billion people. Coincidently India, which has both English and Hindi as an official 
language, is the largest contributor to the population base of both languages. From this it is 
easy to see why India is such an attractive setting for US investment. The absence of lingual 
barriers to the legal system and a massive population where the young are learning English at a 
high rate would have to be considered one of the chief factors. Spanish, Arabic, and French all 
have nearly identical population bases at just fewer than half a billion people. Russian and 
German are decidedly at the bottom. 
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 Behind the efforts of nations like the United States, India, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, 
and the Philippines, English assumes a wide margin in production at roughly $26 trillion 
collectively for the year 2010. 
 
 Mandarin is once again the runner up while Spain finishes solidly in third with just over 
five trillion dollars in production. French and German follow their fellow EU Member State. 
Hindi, Arabic, and finally Russian finish out the list.   
Foreign Direct Investment 
 FDI statistics prove in favor of the English language once again, but this time alongside 
three other official EU languages. An opportunity to see the importance of institutions in 
building conditions favorable to investment is also quite obvious. The economy of the EU is one 
of the most, if not the most, advanced in the world so it should be no surprise that optimal 
conditions for foreign investing appear to be in place as well as evident by English, French, 
German, and Spanish at the top of the results . With the proliferation of English, Spanish, and 
French on multiple continents it would be ignorant of the very data I collected to attribute the 
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total figures to their Euro presence alone. Still German and French far outperformed their 
ranking in the population metric, and German is further set apart in that it is confined to only 
one continent. That the German language world finished with the smallest population base 
makes its success in attracting and spreading FDI even that much more impressive. 
 
 English is in line with previous results in production and population base receiving 
significant contributions across the world. Illustrating again the effects of domestic policy is the 
sharp decline in Mandarin’s foreign investment relative to GDP and population. It is for this 
reason that I added the FDI modifier to the Future Language Production Formula, negating the 
effects of production for a nation like China where the utility of learning Mandarin is reduced in 
light of domestic conditions. Where goods and capital are restricted it not only reduces the 
incentive to invest, but also may limit the likelihood of attracting investment from that same 
nation. 
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Index of Economic Freedom 
 In the same spirit of reducing production value by the extent to which money is 
deterred from being invested within or flowing out, the Index of Economic Freedom is used to 
evaluate the overall climate of the economy through standards associated with relatively 
neoliberal economic principles. The ability to move production factors freely is essential. So too 
are low levels of corruption and tax burden (heritage.org).  Low IEF outcomes across language 
worlds will hopefully show some correlation with lower FDI.  
 
 The German language world scored the highest on the scale of 1-100 with a 74.4 tally. 
Remembering  the impressive German foreign investment figures, IEF has shown to be a good 
indicator in this case. Surprisingly, Mandarin comes through in the second spot while English, 
Spanish, and Arabic are all within a couple points in the middle of the group. Not surprisingly 
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Russian and Hindi finish at or near the bottom, consistant with their low FDI totals. French 
meanwhile reverted to the seventh spot, concerning given their second place finish with FDI. 
 A relationship between IEF and FDI can be seen at some levels, but overall it was not 
captured at the capacity I had hoped for. Limitations and flaws of the study will be summarized 
briefly at the conclusion of part three. 
Literacy 
 Literacy statistics are used in this case to examine the depth and ability of various 
language populatons. An area with high literacy is going to have a more attractive labor force; 
with a higher capacity to adapt and innovate. In my estimation literacy can be simply used as a 
basic indicator of educational standards and a government willing to invest in the human 
capital of its citizens.  
 
 Russian edged out second place German by less than 0.2% in by far its strongest metric 
so far. German, with over 99% literacy across its world, continues to accumulate a high number 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Literacy (%) 
  
64 
 
of points. Mandarin was the only other language world to post a literacy rate of over 90%. Just 
trailing is Spanish at a shade under 90% with English and Hindi at 80% and 77% respectively. 
French and Arabic have literacy rates far below the other six language worlds, both at 67.3% 
overall. 
Population Growth 
 Population and population growth will later be used as a factor which mitigates 
production as per capita figures are established in the Future Language Production Formula 
based on the interaction of the data collected for this index with the other fixed variables 
established previously. This speaks to the dual nature of these variables where low values in 
some areas may be used in hedging language policy with the potential return of lesser 
developed areas against possible domestic disturbences. For now population growth will be 
viewed in connection with the benefits of a stronger labor force and overall increased 
production.  
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 Arabic and French out in front by a large margin when looking at average population 
growth across language worlds. English, Spanish, and Hindi all display moderate growth rates. 
Mandarin grows at a lesser rate, yet still far ahead of German and Russian populations of which 
neither grows at a rate of even 1/3 of a percent. 
Global Reach 
English Spanish French Russian Arabic German Mandarin Hindi 
.95 .90 .85 .80 .80 .75 .75 .75 
 
 Here is a simple measure of the number of continents where each language has official 
status. A baseline of 0.70 is established with 0.05 added for each continent.  Thus the minimum 
figure possible for the languages relevant to this study is 0.75, with a a maximum of 1 if official 
on every continent. Antarctica is not included in the metric for obvious reasons. While the 
figures themselves are arbitrary in connection with the index, the utility of such a modifier will 
be more important in the Future Language Production Formula. From the figures above one can 
see that English is official on five continents, down to German, Mandarin, and Hindi who have 
yet to expand outside of their native one. With official status in South America, North America, 
Europe, and Africa, Spanish is the only other language world in this study who enjoys official 
status on four continents. 
Results 
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 FDI GDP IEF Literacy Population 
Base 
Population 
Growth 
Global 
Reach 
Overall 
(pts) 
1
st
 English English Germ. Russian English Arabic English English 
(43) 
2
nd
 French Mand. Mand. Germ. Mand. French Span.  Mand. 
(29.33) 
3
rd
 Germ. Span English Mand. Hindi English French  German 
(25.33) 
4
th
 Span. French Span. Span. Span. Span. Russian Spanish 
(24.5) 
5
th
 Mand. Germ. Arabic English Arabic Hindi Arabic French 
(24.5) 
6
th
 Arabic Hindi Hindi Hindi French Mand. Mand. Arabic 
(20.5) 
7
th
 Russian Arabic French French Russian Germ. Germ. Russian 
(17.5) 
8
th
 Hindi Russian Russian Arabic Germ. Russian Hindi Hindi 
(15.33) 
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 English attained overwhelming figures in production and population to claim the top 
spot by a wide margin. Following some distance behind is Mandarin, and futher the three 
Western and Central European languages who finished a total of less than one point apart. It 
will be interesting to see how the results of the index stack up with values according to the 
production formula, especially in the absense of growth rates. German appears to be very 
strong with high IEF scores and sizeable FDI. Considering German’s population base is smaller 
than all but one of the the other selected language worlds, Russian, that should promise itself a 
boost under the production formula  where low values in population base are not inherently 
scored lower as in the index. French and Arabic, whose large presense in Africa explains their 
mirrored movements as well as the overall  lower literacy rate and high populaton growth.  
3d.2. Future Language Production Formula 
 I decided  to first test the Language Production Formula without variables or time 
values. Below the equation is restated for convenience and the results in order of their 
weighted per capita GDP.  
FLP(x) = { [Bbt + (Cct x G)] x E} x F  
                  [Aat x D]        
 
bt = 0 Language World GDP/cap
ct = 0 German $20,755
years = 0 French $13,905.65
Russian $7,119.44
Spanish $7,079
English $6,198.93
Mandarin $3,723.19
Arabic $2,841.79
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 As indicated by the left side of the table, fixed growth variables and time are set to zero. 
The results are realtively straight forward, but how do the match up against the results of the 
Language Value Index?  
English 1st German
Mandarin 2nd French
German 3rd Russian
Spanish 4th Spanish
French 5th English
Arabic 6th Mandarin
Russian 7th Arabic Language Value Index
Hindi 8th Hindi
Language Production Formula
 
 The difference in the rankings is evident by the difference in the construction of the 
models. Looking back at the index, and the overwhelming dominance of English, it may seem 
hard to imagine that by other standards it could fall into the middle of the group. As intended 
however the emphasis on bulk was removed to get production far more in relation to size.  In 
terms of positioning, both Hindi and Arabic finished at or near the bottom of both lists. Spanish 
also remained consistent between the two approaches. German finished in the top echelon of 
both as well. English and French were far more sporatic based upon which criterion was used, 
but was to be expected from languages so broad in base once that advantage was mitigated. Is 
there any real doubt that English at this instant is the most dominant language in the world in 
terms usage and scope? I don’t know any reasonable people who would argue against it. But 
does that necessarily mean it’s the best option for creating policy around?  It is surely possible, 
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but one could also make the argument that the marginal utility of English is dwindling with 
every new speaker. For the second trial it is imperative that a future value is determined as it is 
its intended purpose. 
 For round two I will look at English, French, and Arabic which each have a sizeable 
language presence in Africa. Looking at the data across African nations, regardless of language 
group, confirms quickly that GDP, FDI, IEF, and literacy are substandard when compared to the 
majority of other data points. Perhaps those best suited for joint cooperation are those who 
can readily communicate and organize through common language. To illustrate the territory 
these languages possess in Africa I cropped a graphic intended for part four so the reader can 
understand the current lingual dynamic in Africa. The area painted red is where English is 
offical, brown as French, and grey the Arabic speaking states. States where more than one of 
the languages is official is designated by multiple official colors in the nation. Note that in the 
graphic the Middle East has crept in into view but whose nations are not the topic of this trial. 
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 As a hypothetical we are to assume that the prospect of Africa developing at a fast pace 
has become quite real due to enhanced regional cooperation and joint projects with the likes of 
the EU and USA for help in providing a sound infrastructural base for modernizaton.   
 With this in mind projections, what kind of an effect will Africa’s growth have on 
language production across the selected language worlds? To answer this question I assumed a 
fifteen year period of accelerated growth evenly distributed across the entirety of nations on 
the continent. With increased demand, investment, and domestic production in Africa other 
areas see a slight reduction in FDI inflow and export activity. Below is how the figures respond 
to the Future Language Production Model when growth varies according to language presence 
in Africa. Before the fifteen year period begins is based on the 2010 data and thus is used as a 
reference point. 
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 From this we can see that through the African development English overtakes Spanish 
and nears Russian production levels. Before the focus turns back on policy in the European 
Union inefficiencies with the model will be revealed. 
Shortcomings of the Models 
 Of the problems I ran into while designing the study it was time and manpower which 
ended up being the biggest barrier to achieving I desired to with the formula. Had I more time I 
would have liked to group the nations by continent as well to see the varied response by 
languages groups against acceleration in single growth area. For the purpose of test two, it 
would have been interesting to tab all of the African nations and accelerate growth to watch 
what happens between English, Arabic, and French but without having to attribute the same 
rates to the English, Arabic, and French speaking world outside of Africa.  
bt = 7.00% Language Pro / cap ($) 2010 level
ct = 4.00% English $12,907.62 $6,189.93
years = 15.00 French $22,151.00 $13,905.65
Arabic $5,677.00 $2,841.00
German $38,302.02 $20,755.24
bt = 4.50% Mandarin $6,491.16 $3,723.18
ct = 1.00% Hindi $1,979.66 $1,202.00
years = 15.00 Spanish $10,803.77 $7,079.00
Russian $12,937.00 $7,119.44
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 The dual nature of the used variables was also another problem to deal with from a 
planning aspect. For an example let’s take population growth. At times, population growth is 
looked at as a way of strengthening the labor force or a sign of rising health standards and 
quality of life. At the same time, growth can be dangerous and a signal of future problems. It is 
possible that 2% population growth in country A is positive where it is unwanted in B and as a 
result hard to model in terms of attractiveness. 
 I also neglected to add a standard inflation rate to see what kind of production growth is 
needed in order to improve per capita production. In terms of the growth rates for GDP and 
FDI, it would have been smart to have an adaptable measure for the institutional aspect as well, 
perhaps an adjustable IEF. 
 Finally I would have prevented a couple of technique errors that arose simply out of 
own inexperience in developing a model of this extent. Had I the opportunity to do it again I 
would make sure that the total figures are properly weighted for the size of the inputs. Once 
again drawing from the Language Index, the measurement of IEF placed Mandarin second for 
economic freedom because of the extremely high score for Singapore, only alongside of China 
the Mandarin language world. While these figures were averaged, China is the force behind the 
vast majority of production and population and should have influenced at a rate more in line 
with its contribution 
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Part 4: A Dynamic Language Policy for the European Union 
 Before moving forward into the actual design, it is first important to respond to some of 
the criticism seen early with language policy and selection.   
Response to Earlier Criticism 
 I will focus on the critic who was most aggressive in his approach, Robert Phillipson, and 
specifically on two points that I contend with. First a response to Phillipson’s claim that;  
Lingua Franca is a pernicious term if the language in question is a first language 
for some people but foreign for others. It is a misleading term if the language is 
supposed to be neutral and disconnected from culture. It is false for a language 
that is taught as a subject in general education (Phillipson, 3). 
 First, the harm in adopting a local living language as the Lingua Franca is unwarranted. 
Not only does it make the most sense in terms of application and logistics, but burden 
experienced during language learning falls on both parties at some level. For the learner, it is a 
disadvantage if he were competing with a native speaker solely on the command of language. 
For the native speaker, more and more foreign language speakers opens areas previously 
reserved for native speakers and will eventually reduce the utility of its knowledge. 
 Second, there is nothing misleading about language and neutrality. It is this argument 
which seems the weakest to Often put in the context of English, I wonder why it seems the 
adaptability and flexibility of the English language has largely been ignored. Not only spoken as 
an official language on five continents, but it is the native language in many countries as well 
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who have developed it into something which represents them, not takes from them. The 
assertion that English is more American than Australian or British, or that somehow the two 
cultures are bound by language, largely ignores the very manner in which English has been used 
by third parties and now has a unique feel specific to those who adopted it. And further where 
is the evidence that the adopters’ cultures have eroded due to the choice in language and not 
other factors? If the imperialism is so great, why are so many English speaking nations 
struggling when “infiltrated” by US ideals that would have been thought to streamline their 
efforts with the US? 
 Finally, if a lingua franca is dangerous when taught in public education, where would a 
better setting be? Where else but schools would one be able to learn a language alongside 
others who will also give the language a feel that is unique to them with words and phrases and 
expressions not found in English elsewhere? Until the lingua franca is self-replicated through 
inclusion in the household and naturally learned language locations, learning a language from a 
young age anywhere else is unrealistic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
75 
 
 
 
A Economic Approach to EU Language Policy 
 
To the left is a map I filled in 
according to the data 
collected for the formation  
of language worlds in part 
3. Where red English is 
official, orange for Russian, 
blue Spanish, dark green for 
Mandarin, light green Hindi, 
grey for Arabic, brown French, and purple for German. Perhaps the EU would benefit from 
modeling its language policy in a similarly looking diversified manner which through 
multilingualism can act as strategic outlets throughout Europe and the world. 
 If policy were to be formed from an economic standpoint the first need is for an 
administrative lingua franca in the European Union and an end to the translation nightmare. 
For the sake of convenience and current aptitude it seems as though English would be the most 
efficient choice, but certainly there are other viable options. Translation duties at the EU level 
could be significantly reduced and managed then at the national level where the vast majority 
would be translated just once from English to the national language. 
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 The second part of policy is focused around which languages are learned and where. I 
look for the EU to stay within its trilingual goal with minimum language education standards 
applied across the Union but with some sovereignty over selection residing with the Member 
States. The first language in the triumvirate is, of course, the national language which is still 
protected as official by the EU. The second language to be taught is another European language 
to strengthen mobility and increase social cohesion. Remembering all the way back to the 
studies in part one, it is important to remember the 77% of EU citizens who believed that 
English was most important to the development and future of their children. I believe it is 
Before any politicians seriously object, how many of them were sworn in by such an 
overwhelming majority?  
Finally the third language will be a language from outside the EU, left to the discretion 
of the Member States. This discretion should be used carefully, looking to form partnerships 
and facilitate cooperation with areas who can benefit mutually. Perhaps joint language 
between nations can take place where the incentives are realized. A Balkan area with 
knowledge of Arabic is could be instrumental in developing the economy alongside those in 
northern Africa. In the same sense, Eastern Europe, especially in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia 
where preference and ability are higher, could go a long way in enhancing Euro-Russian 
relations through endorsement in language, while also further opening the economies to each 
other. With many possible incentives, it is important for further studies in this context. 
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Conclusion 
 For the European Union to fulfill its goal as the most capable and sustainable economy 
in the world it is imperative that language policy becomes a high priority for both the EU 
institutions and the Member States.  
In part one it became clear just how difficult the language situation in Europe is. With 23 
official languages management becomes expensive and timely. Further, preferences for 
language learning are diverse and gives rise to power struggles over which language to work in 
or which languages to promote. Without an ability to enact policy on its own, the EU has thus 
been relegated to funding various programs to enhance communication, solidarity, and 
mobility. Despite these efforts criticism has risen higher and higher often focusing around the 
dominance of English at the expense of other official languages.  
In part two it became obvious that language was a major factor in advancing the EU 
from an economic standpoint. The functioning of the monetary union could very well be 
enhanced through the elimination of lingual barriers to action where otherwise preference 
would act as adjustment.  Proper selection from an economic standpoint is critical as a way of 
maximizing the mobilization of citizens and attracting investment where comparative 
advantage where attainable. This opens the door to many possible languages then, and 
selection could depend on any number of languages depending on the realities at hand. 
Thinking of language through economic ends is not intended to be the only way of examining 
policy and it would be unwise to treat it as such. Nevertheless there are overlapping social and 
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political gains to be made through a language policy that enhances the economic area of the 
EU. Nevertheless I hope to have contributed to the ways in which language and economic 
incentives can be aligned through the creation of the Language Value Index and the Language 
Production Model which also can look at future potential across language worlds. 
 In the coming years language and language policy will become even more critical to the 
functioning of the European Union. The younger generations of the EU are learning language at 
an a high rate and it would be detrimental to all to marginalize their efforts and openness with 
inaction from some, and with tactics that one is deserting their heritage for that of the lingual 
imperialist from others. It is rather silly to assume that the acquisition of language is for lack of 
a better term, selling out. Acquiring this asset is the opposite as it gives outlet to ones heritage, 
experiences, beliefs, and so on. At the same time it is natural for some languages are going to 
be more attractive than others to learn depending on space and time. As long as language is 
protected under modern democratic institutions, such as the EU’s, worries of eroding national 
languages will be farfetched. I would agree with those who believe that minority and regional 
languages are in peril. Yet this is nothing new and under no additional threat if policy were to 
come from the EU regarding this type of institutional change. With an understanding of the 
EU’s ability to legislate current, it would be unfair to emphasize unwarranted blame at the EU 
for longer failures of domestic policy.  
 Preaching the free movement of goods, services, and labor is one thing, but it is another 
to facilitate the conditions which optimize them. The preference for fluidity is growing as the 
  
79 
 
most educated and linguistically diverse generation of Europeans hit the labor markets. It is 
essential any success they bring to the Union is reciprocated through thoughtful and diligent 
policy making at the EU level. This means that nations must be willing to hand over some 
elements of sovereignty. The EU, when given the chance, must show a willingness to allow for 
domestic preferences in language selection as well. If nothing else minimum criteria for 
language education should be attainable with clear established goals. For those member states 
that are unwilling to cooperate in this regard, I hope with this skepticism comes active domestic 
policy.  
  This study has been a chance for me to talk with friends and other students from all 
over the world about their feelings on some of these issues regarding language and a great deal 
of credit goes to them in developing ideas goes to them. At this same time, much of the 
inspiration to look at language in some capacity has been the disappointment in seeing the 
number of relationships that have gone either unformed or undeveloped because of language 
differences in the last two years. While I did not by any means live up to my end in this way, it 
would be unfair to not acknowledge them for their role in this as well.  
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